After Xi Jinping’s rise, one of the most important departures in Chinese foreign policy towards Nepal is the idea of policy exchange. This idea of policy exchange goes much beyond exchange visits.
Through policy exchange, China wants to actively encourage Nepal to adopt models of governance and development that can align with foreign policy interests of China.
The idea of China pushing models of governance and development is not new and is much talked about in different parts of Asia and Africa. However, this is something new for Nepal and there is little understanding in Nepal of how it works.
What does China mean by strategic communications?
Let’s start with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019.
A day prior to his visit, President Xi Jinping published a signed article in major Nepali media outlets where he outlined four key strategies in China’s relations with Nepal.
The four strategies are:
- Deepen strategic communication
- Broaden practical cooperation
- Expand people-to-people exchanges, and
- Enhance security cooperation
The first point, “deepen strategic communication,” helps us understand Xi Jinping’s vision. He said Nepal and China needed to adopt “a strategic and long-term perspective and draw up a blueprint for our bilateral relationship to take it to a new height in this new era.” He wrote: “We need to maintain high-level exchanges, enhance political mutual trust, and continue to render mutual support on issues concerning each other’s core interests.”
Most importantly, regarding policy exchanges, he wrote, “We may also have more exchanges and experience sharing on governance and development to deliver greater benefits to our two peoples.”
We can infer from this statement that the idea of policy exchange has to do with governance and development.
The joint statement issued after his visit also reflected on this aspect. The fourth point of the joint statement said:
“Both sides underlined that high-level contacts are of special importance to the development of bilateral relations. The two sides agreed to maintain the momentum of high-level visits, deepen political mutual trust and expand exchanges and cooperation between government ministries, departments, legislatures and political parties at all levels.”
Here, we can infer that the idea of policy exchanges in relation to governance and development has been rephrased to suit the Nepali side.
The key point here is that the idea of strategic communication is intended to influence Nepal’s governance and development process.
The idea of policy exchanges is reflected in Article II of the BRI MoU under areas of cooperation. Policy exchange, in this instance, is to “carry out dialogues and exchanges in areas of major development strategies, plans and policies.”
The idea is elaborated in Article III to include cooperation modalities like information and knowledge sharing, but the options are open.
The joint press statement issued during Prachanda’s visit to China in September 2023 also elaborated on the idea of policy exchanges. The joint statement said, “The two sides will maintain the momentum of high-level exchanges, deepen political mutual trust, and expand exchanges and cooperation at all levels between the two countries.”
Xi Jinping’s psychological and ideological inclinations
In order to understand this claim, we have to explore Chinese President Xi Jinping’s psychological and ideological inclinations.
A former Australian PM, Kevin Rudd has written an insightful piece in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. The crux of his argument is that Marxist Leninist ideology combined with nationalism can explain China’s politics, economics and foreign policy behaviour much more than realism or liberalism.
For example, the idea of dialectical materialism understands the world and society in terms of internal contradictions, and historical materialism as class struggle. In practical terms, it can mean the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and reactionary forces both at home and abroad.
Here in Nepal, we can feel the impact of his Marxist Leninist ideology as well as nationalist foreign policy, which aims to become the preeminent power in Asia and the Globe by 2049.
Xi believes that ideological decay can lead to the collapse of CCP and China. Maybe he sees the same kind of struggle being played out in Nepal. It could be one of the reasons why China’s CCP is so interested in strengthening and uniting communist movement in Nepal.
For example, China has stood firm in its border conflict with India, and border policy with Nepal. It is clear that Nepal’s policy in the last few years has offended Beijing.
Recent narratives
China’s interest in policy exchange to influence Nepal’s governance and development model is not a one off. It constantly repeats in the statements of Chinese leaders and officials.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Nepal in March 2022, he told Xinhua that China supports Nepal in three key aspects. The first was that “China will support Nepal in finding a development path suited to its national conditions” and that “China’s friendly policy” was “open to all parties and party factions, and the people of Nepal.” He said China “encourages all parties and party factions in Nepal to jointly explore a governance model that is conducive to promoting political stability, economic growth and people’s livelihood.”
Second, he said “China supports Nepal in pursuing independent domestic and foreign policies.” This is a clear hint that China wants Nepal to free itself from the influence of India and the US and play a bigger role in the region. Third, he said “China supports Nepal in furthering participation in the Belt and Road Initiative.”
We can interpret his statement as the definition of policy exchange or strategic communication.
First, urging all parties to find a development path suited to Nepal’s national conditions, is synonymous with adopting Chinese models of governance and development. Second, supporting “Nepal in pursuing independent domestic and foreign policies” means weaning Nepal away from Indian and western influence, seen by Xi Jinping as reactionary forces.
And, Third, China wants Nepal’s further participation in BRI, which means closer integration with China.
China’s interest in Nepal’s governance was further reflected during the visit of Li Zhanshu, the head of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress. A joint statement said, the two sides will “give importance to exchange of information related to each other’s legislative, supervisory and governance practices.”
China’s rise has meant that many countries in Asia and Africa are beginning to adopt Chinese models of development and governance.
For example, in Africa, Chinese foreign policy is expected to enlist African support for “reshaping global institutions and validating China’s governance norms.”
A positive-sounding narrative
Of course, China’s policies towards Nepal can be seen in neutral terms and as aligned with Nepal’s national interests. China has built a narrative that sounds positive as it talks about things like equality, development, political stability, friendship and common interests.
However, analysis of China’s realist objectives and the broader context of Chinese foreign policy strategy shows that its policy is more closely aligned with Chinese interests.
Chinese narratives resonate with the sentiments of Nepali people.
There are several reasons that can facilitate Chinese efforts to decouple models of governance and development from western ideals.
First, is Nepal’s ideological landscape and political polarisation. After Mao Zedong, China had more or less abandoned communist ideological principles. However, Xi Jinping has resurrected Marxist and Leninist ideals, which in turn, has great affinity with Nepal’s own communist movement.
Second, corruption, impunity and flawed political culture is spreading the message that democracy is failing in Nepal. There is a tendency to blame the democratic system itself, rather than its practitioners, the politicians and the state.
Third, many Nepalese people believe that democracy is a hindrance to development and that in order to achieve big infrastructure and development projects, we need to bypass the democratic red-tape.
Fourth, there is already a widespread discontent with India and the West, which are seen as interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs and promoting inclusion and human rights against the interests of a majority population.
Fifth, China is waiting to reclaim its lost space in Nepal. According to former ambassador of China to Nepal, Hou Yanqi, there were two major factors responsible for the slowing down the “pace of pragmatic cooperation” in Nepal. The first was Covid 19 pandemic and the second, more important one, was “changes in the political situation in Nepal.” Another major reason is geopolitical pressures from India and the west.
My own feeling is that there is another factor, the role of leading bureaucrats, who are careful to weigh national interests against pressures from China. In my personal conversations with some of the bureaucrats, it appears that China has also realised that bureaucracy in Nepal has been a hurdle and they are seeking ways to increase their influence in the bureaucracy.
All of these factors, however, are slowly shifting and there is a possibility that, if governance continues to be a problem, a populist mass can revolt against the political establishment aligned with India and the west in the next decade.